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Patent damages are designed to compensate patentees for their
losses, not punish accused infringers or require them to disgorge
their profits.' The governing statute provides for "damages adequate
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty."2 Courts interpreting this provision have divided
patent damages into two groups-lost profits, available to patent
owners who would have made sales in the absence of infringement,
and reasonable royalties, a fallback remedy for everyone else.3
Traditionally, patentees want to prove lost profits because only that
measure captures the monopoly value of excluding competitors
from the market. As the statutory language suggests, reasonable
royalties exist as a floor or backstop for those who cannot prove that
they have lost profits as a result of infringement.4 The rationale is
that an infringed patent is valuable and could be licensed for a fee
t © 2009 Mark A. Lemley.
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1. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For a
general economic analysis of patent damages, see ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 208-62
(2005).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). The statute also provides for treble damages, though case law
requires a showing of willfulness before enhancing damages. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
3. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir.
1978) ("When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, cannot be proved, the patent owner is entitled
to a reasonable royalty.").
4. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
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even by patent owners who don't employ the patent in the market-
place.
In practice, however, the lines between lost profits and reasonable
royalties are blurring. In significant part, this is because courts
have insisted on strict standards of proof for entitlement to lost
profits. Specifically, patentees must prove demand for the patented
product, the absence of noninfringing substitutes, the ability to meet
additional demand in the absence of infringement, and the propor-
tion of those sales that represent profits.' This in turn means that
many patent owners who have in fact probably lost sales to
infringement cannot prove lost profits damages and must fall back
on the reasonable royalty measure.6 The result is that courts have
distorted the reasonable royalty measure in various ways, adding
"kickers" to increase damages, artificially raising the reasonable
royalty rate, or importing inapposite concepts like the "entire
market value rule" in an effort to compensate patent owners whose
real remedy probably should have been in the lost profits category.7
Unfortunately, Congress is now considering locking one of those
distortions-the entire market value rule-into reasonable royalty
law.8
In Part I, I explain the strict requirements for proving lost profits
and give examples of patentees who have failed to meet these
requirements. In Part II, I explain how relegating these patentees
to reasonable royalties has led to problematic changes in reasonable
royalty law. Finally, I suggest in Part III that courts should draw a
sharp division between the injury suffered by patentees who com-
pete with infringers and those who do not. Patentees who compete
should be entitled to the best estimate of lost profits, even if not all
elements of proof are available. Those entitled to a reasonable
royalty should get just that-a reasonable award that reflects
what a buyer would have been willing to pay to license a valid
patent. By distinguishing the two types of harm and the correspond-
ing remedies, courts can end the overcompensation of patent owners
in reasonable royalty cases.
5. Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1156.
6. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 34.
8. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
656 [Vol. 51:655
DISTINGUISHING LOST PROFITS
I. LOSING ENTITLEMENT TO LOST PROFITS
The traditional conception of patent protection is to give patent
owners a means of excluding competitors from selling the patented
product, thereby increasing their profits and therefore the incentive
of putative patent owners to invent. This traditional conception
requires exclusivity; the value of a patent is accordingly commensu-
rate with the value of the market or market niche it controls. It
explains why the normal remedy for infringement of a patent is an
injunction against continued infringement.9
Lost profits fit logically within this traditional conception. Giving
patentees the profits they would have made absent the infringement
effectively puts them in the same position as if they had had an
injunction in place all along.'0 To the extent that it doesn't-when
a patentee lost market traction early in a growing market and never
built market share, for example-the law of lost profits has ex-
panded over time to try to compensate the patent owner for those
uses."
Proving lost profits has not been easy, however. Federal Circuit
law requires that the prevailing patentee prove (1) the extent of
demand for the patented product, (2) the absence of noninfringing
substitutes for that product, (3) the patentee's ability to meet the
additional demand by expanding manufacturing capacity, and (4)
the extent of profits the patentee would have made.' 2 Further, the
9. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REv. 1991, 2036 (2007). Ted Sichelman has challenged this view, arguing that giving even
manufacturing patent owners the value of exclusivity needlessly overcompensates them. See
Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
10. The Supreme Court has described this as the purpose of patent damages. Aro Mfg. Co.
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476,507 (1964) ("[Tjhat question [is] primarily:
had the Infringer not infringed, what would Patent Holder-Licensee have made?"); Yale Lock
Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886) (stating that a patentee's damages are "the
difference between his pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition
would have been if the infringement had not occurred"); John W. Schlicher, Measuring Patent
Damages by the Mdrket Value of Inventions: The Grain Processing, Rite-Hite, and Aro Rules,
82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY' 503, 503 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(awarding lost profits damages based on the patentee's lost ability to grow, and therefore to
sell other, unpatented products).
12. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th
2009] 657
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:655
cases require sophisticated economic analysis of the interrelation-
ship between price and demand. For instance, claims of price
erosion must be discounted to the extent that the higher prices a
patentee could have charged absent competition would have driven
away some consumers.'" The cases also require inquiry into how the
patentee would divide sales with other companies in the market
that were either licensed or selling noninfringing goods.14
Courts take these requirements seriously and quite often reject
claims for lost profits. To begin, it should be obvious that patentees
cannot possibly meet these requirements unless they participate in
the market in direct competition with the infringer. 5 However, even
competitors often have trouble demonstrating entitlement to lost
profits. Sometimes this is because they actually didn't lose any
profits, because, for example, purchasers didn't value the patented
technology at all and would happily have switched to noninfringing
substitutes.1 6 Other times it is because the patentee itself couldn't
Cir. 1978). The Federal Circuit has adopted this framework as the predominant, though not
exclusive, way to analyze lost profits. Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d
549 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
13. See, e.g., Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d
1336, 1357-61 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
14. There are a number of ways that courts assess this, including expert testimony, the
testimony of the infringer's customers as to what they would have done absent infringement,
and a presumption that, when the patentee competes with noninfringing alternatives, the
patentee and the competitors would split the infringer's sales. See State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-
Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (applying this market share rule).
15. BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(reversing an award of lost profits because the patentee and the infringer did not compete);
cf. Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quiniton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(describing it as a "general rule" that patentees producing the patented item are entitled to
lost profits damages); John E. Dubiansky, An Analysis for the Valuation of Venture Capital-
Funded Startup Firm Patents, 12 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 170, 177 (2006) ("In the licensing
context, however, the patent owner is not engaged in an enterprise which utilizes the patent.
Consequentially, the owner has no profits to have lost, and is only eligible to receive a
reasonable royalty.").
16. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349-50 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (rejecting lost profits claim because evidence showed that patentee would not have
made sales; infringers would have switched almost immediately to an equally-good,
noninfringing alternative); Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1458-59
(Fed. Cir. 1991); cf. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(rejecting a claim for the availability of easy design-arounds when the evidence suggested the
design-around would not have been straightforward at the time of infringement). But see Zygo
Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (seeming to set a flat rule preventing
consideration of noninfringing substitutes not actually on the market at the time of
658
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have manufactured the products and therefore lost the sales.17 Still
other cases involve more technical failures of proof, for example a
failure to adequately segregate profits from costs or a lack of
economic sophistication in analyzing market demand and its
elasticity."8
A dramatic example is the foundational case on patent damages,
Panduit v. Stahlin.9 In the opinion authored by Judge Markey,
later Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, the court held that the
patentee had proven demand for the patented product, an absence
of noninfringing substitutes, and the ability to exploit demand and
therefore make sales.2" Nonetheless, the court held that the
patentee was not entitled to lost profits because it did not ade-
quately separate profits from costs.' There was no dispute that
Panduit accounted for variable costs or that it tried to exclude fixed
costs as well.22 But expert witnesses disagreed about the correct way
infringement).
Hausman et al. suggest that considering noninfringing substitutes unfairly gives the
infringer the benefit of a free option to infringe or not. Jerry A. Hausman et al., Patent
Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Noninfringing Alternatives
Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 825, 845-46 (2007). To the contrary,
the option comes at a price-the payment of the greater of lost profits, if proven, or a
reasonable royalty. Cases like Grain Processing eliminate what otherwise would have been
an overcharge-the ability of the patentee to recover in damages profits it would not have
made in fact-rendering lost profits damages more consistent with their compensatory
purpose. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not been clear in its application of the Grain
Processing rule. See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (rejecting Grain Processing in a reasonable royalty case).
17. See, e.g., Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(rejecting lost profits claim because there was no evidence that the patentee would in fact
have devoted resources to meeting the demand for the infringer's product). A strict application
of this rule would overlook the ability of the patentee to license others to meet that demand.
Cf. Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, 775 F.2d 268, 276-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (permitting
evidence of subcontracting to a sister company).
18. See, e.g., Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (rejecting
claim for convoyed sales, in part because the patentee did not present evidence of projected
profits from those sales); Slimfold, 932 F.2d at 1458 (affirming refusal to award lost profits
that were estimated on a market-share basis despite evidence that the patentee competed
with others in the market in which the infringer participated); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros.
Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156-57 (6th Cir. 1978) (refusing to award lost profits
because patentee failed to account properly for fixed costs to be deducted from profits).
19. 575 F.2d at 1152.
20. Id. at 1156.
21. Id. at 1157.
22. Id. at 1156-57.
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to account for fixed costs, and the court concluded that because it
couldn't be sure what fixed costs to include, it had to reject the lost
profits claim altogether in favor of a reasonable royalty.23
Once a patentee proves entitlement to lost profits, the scope of the
resulting award can be quite expansive. Patentees can recoup losses
on sales they in fact made if they can prove that they were forced to
lower their prices to meet infringing competition.24 They can capture
the defendant's sales of unpatented goods that compete with the
patented invention.25 They are entitled to capture the value of sales
of an entire product based on a single patented component if they
can prove that the patented feature is what caused the sale, so that
the defendant's infringement garnered a sale that otherwise would
have gone to the patentee.26 This is known as the "entire market
value rule."27 Patentees are entitled to capture profits based on the
sale of "convoyed goods"-goods that are not part of the patented
product at all, but that are sold in connection with the patented
good and therefore likely would have been sold by the patentee if
the patentee rather than the infringer had made the sale of the
infringing good. Patentees are even entitled to capture sales by the
defendant after the patent has expired, if those sales were made
possible by infringing preparatory activity by the defendant during
the term of the patent.28
23. Id.
24. See Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (affirming award of price erosion damages); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-
Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming award of losses based on projected
declining marginal cost of producing goods as scale increased). Such price erosion may take
place not only in response to actual infringing sales, but also in response to mere offers to sell,
because offers to sell are now infringing. For a discussion, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability
for the "Threat of a Sale" Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering To Sell an Invention and
Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 751 (2003).
25. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
26. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. Mar-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1989); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Kori Corp. v. Wilco
Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1985); King Instrument Corp.
v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
27. State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1580.
28. BIC Leisure Prods. v. Windsurfing Intl, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 134, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), rev'd in part on other grounds, 1 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (permitting recovery for
"accelerated [market] reentry" by the infringer after the patent expires).
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The effect of these rules is generally salutary: the lost profits
doctrine aims to put patentees in the position they would have been
in but for the infringement, and the tools the law uses to accomplish
this end are quite economically sophisticated. But the high standard
of proof means that there are many patentees who are not in fact
made whole for the acts of infringement under the lost profits rule.
II. ARE REASONABLE ROYALTIES REASONABLE?
Patentees who cannot prove lost profits, either because they
didn't have any lost profits or because they failed to meet the
standards of proof, are relegated to a "reasonable royalty" remedy.
Reasonable royalties are like lost profits in that both are designed
to compensate patentees for their losses. But there the similarity
ends. Reasonable royalty law is designed with the nonmanufac-
turing patentee in mind.29 And what it takes to "make the patentee
whole" is very different if the patentee's only interest is in licensing
the patent than if the patentee's interest is in excluding competition
and maintaining a monopoly price.3 ° Thus, reasonable royalty case
law properly inquires into what the marketplace would actually pay
for rights to the technology, bearing in mind that the licensee has to
make a profit as well.3' By contrast, it is not only possible but
common that lost profits will exceed the defendant's gains from
infringement.32
The idea that patent damages tend to be greater in lost profits
cases than in reasonable royalty cases makes sense for policy
purposes, so long as the reasonable royalty awards go to patentees
29. See Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment To Rein in the Georgia-
Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2008).
30. Accord Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 199, 253 (2006) (arguing
that the damages awarded must take into account the way in which the patentee is harmed,
and that manufacturing and nonmanufacturing patent owners are harmed differently).
31. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 2019.
32. The economic logic of this is straightforward: a patentee with market power will
charge a profit-maximizing monopoly price. By contrast, two companies in competition will
charge a price lower than the monopoly price, generating less profit to share between them
and more consumer surplus. Putting the patentee who faced competition back into the
position of receiving a monopoly price requires the infringer to compensate the patentee for
the money it has lost to consumer surplus as well as the money it lost to the infringer. Thus,
the infringer regularly will have to pay as damages more than it made in profits.
2009] 661
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who are not in fact selling products in the market. But if the
recipients of reasonable royalty damages are in fact competitors who
failed to meet the rigorous requirements of proof of lost profits, the
result may be that those patentees are undercompensated by a
traditional reasonable royalty approach. Courts have responded to
the perceived unfairness of this result33 by expanding reasonable
royalty damages in a variety of ways. First, courts have applied
control-of-sales concepts from lost profits to reasonable royalty
cases. In its most extreme form, this includes the application of the
"entire market value rule" to reasonable royalty cases."4 The term
33. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 980 (4th ed.
2007) (suggesting that artificially high reasonable royalties may be justified as a way of
"dispens[ing] with" proof of lost profits while adequately compensating patentees who have
lost profits). One might question whether this is unfair, given that these plaintiffs, by
definition, failed to meet the proof requirements for lost profits. I would distinguish between
cases like Grain Processing, in which the patentee would not have made the sales at all, and
cases in which the patentee probably did lose sales and it is just the measure of those sales
or the resulting profits that could not be proven. The former restriction makes sense; the
latter deprives patent owners of a return that they would have made absent the infringement.
Accord Schlicher, supra note 10, at 532 (approving of Grain Processing).
It is worth noting that the patentee in Grain Processing might have been able to make the
infringing sales by cutting the price on all its goods so that its profit margin was less than the
3 percent cost differential between the patented invention and the noninfringing substitute.
See Hausman et al., supra note 16, at 846-47. Given the small difference there, it seems
doubtful that doing so would have been net profitable for the patentee. But patentees should
certainly have the opportunity to prove that they would have cut their prices across the board
to price a less efficient competitor out of the market, and to recover any lost profits (net of the
reduced profits on sales they made anyway) such a strategy would have generated.
34. The Federal Circuit endorsed this expansion in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("[C]ourts have applied a formulation known as the
'entire market value rule' to determine whether such components should be included in the
damage computation, whether for reasonable royalty purposes ... or for lost profits purposes.").
The reference to reasonable royalties was dictum there, though, since Rite-Hite itself involved
lost profits. Ironically, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit had applied the entire market
value rule to decide a reasonable royalty case before this statement in Rite-Hite. The case
Rite-Hite relied on, Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 1 (Ct. Cl.
1942), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 320 U.S. 1 (1943), certainly did not do so; that case
involved an accounting for profits (no longer available under the law since 1946) for the
infringing reconstruction of previously sold radios, and in any event Marconi actively
participated in the market. But courts have since relied on that language to import the
concept into reasonable royalty cases. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich., Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1997). And the Federal Circuit
in Lucent v. Gateway said that the entire market value rule applied to reasonable royalty
cases, though a review of the opinion suggests that the court actually confused the entire
market value rule with the question of the royalty base. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
662
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"entire market value rule" is a misnomer. As Brian Love has
observed, it is effectively never the case that the patent is responsi-
ble for all of the value of a product.35 Most commonly, other patents
also contribute to the defendant's product.36 Even if there are no
other relevant patents, the defendant's know-how, materials, and
marketing efforts almost always contribute some value, and usually
the most significant part of the value of an infringing product.37
The entire market value rule nonetheless makes a certain amount
of sense in lost profits cases because, if most of the value of the
defendant's product is attributable to the patentee's technology, it
is reasonable to conclude that, but for the infringement, the defen-
dant's customers would have bought the product from the plaintiff
instead.38 In such a case, while the defendant almost certainly
contributed some value to the ultimate product, it would not have
made the sale of that product at all but for the infringement.
Instead, the plaintiff would have made the sale and so the plaintiff
would have captured whatever incidental value was due to nonin-
fringing attributes. So the entire market value rule is really a
presumption that if most of the market value comes from the patent,
a practicing patentee would have been able to capture the entire
value by making the sale.39
The logic of the entire market value rule breaks down in reason-
able royalty cases, however, because we're no longer talking about
the defendant taking a sale away from the plaintiff. Instead, the
580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). On the entire market value rule in lost profits cases, see 7
DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENT LAW § 20.03[1][c] [iii] (2007).
35. See Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule,
60 STAN. L. REV. 263, 278 (2007); see also Bensen & White, supra note 29, at 4 (observing that
a real-world negotiation would result in the parties splitting only profits attributable to the
infringement); Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel
"Cold Fusion"Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 449
(2007) (same).
36. See David W. Opdenbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89
B.U. L. REV. 127, 186 (2009).
37. See Bensen & White, supra note 29, at 32.
38. See Love, supra note 35, at 275-76.
39. Even then, the plaintiff has not truly contributed the entire market value of the
product. Other patentees still must be paid, and if the patentee would have made the sale of
the whole product but for the infringement, it is the patentee who would have had to pay
them. So even an entire market value rule should deduct from the award the costs of making
the product, including the costs of paying royalties to other patentees.
2009] 663
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question is how to compensate the nonpracticing patentee for the
value of the patented technology. But since there is always at least
some value to the defendant's product not attributable to the patent,
any application of the entire market value rule in a reasonable
royalty setting necessarily overcompensates the patent owner by
giving it value not in fact attributable to the patent.4 ° One way to
see this is to recognize that if the patentee has truly contributed the
entire market value of the technology, no other contribution to the
product should be valued at all. On this the6iry, if a patentee wins
an entire market value rule case, no other patentee should be able
to recover any damages based on the sale of the same product. But
of course, that is not the law.41 It seems probable that the doctrinal
creep of the entire market value rule into reasonable royalty cases
came about because of patent plaintiffs who really had unsuccessful
lost profits cases.42
40. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 2024. The Supreme Court stated the issue a
century ago in terms that seem to foreclose application of the entire market value rule in
reasonable royalty cases: "In so far as the profits from the infringing sales were attributable
to the patented improvements they belonged to the plaintiff, and in so far as they were due
to other parts or features they belonged to the defendants." Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn.
Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641,646 (1915); accord Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536,
552-53 (1886).
41. To be sure, this problem affects application of the entire market value rule in lost
profits cases as well. But it is one thing to impose this disadvantage on a defendant in order
to adequately compensate a plaintiff who has in fact lost profits; it is quite another to make
a defendant pay too much in the aggregate in order to provide an unearned windfall to a
reasonable royalty plaintiff. As noted above, the best solution in lost profits cases is to deem
royalties on other patents a cost and therefore deduct it from the profits that the patentee
would have made.
Doug Lichtman has suggested that the royalty stacking problem will be a self-limiting one,
because companies can't afford to pay more than the entire value of their product, and if
aggregate royalties get too high they will simply stop making the product. Douglas Lichtman,
Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. ACAD.
ADVISORY COUNCIL BULL. 1.3 (2006), available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ip/bulletins/
bulletinl.3patent.pdf. But even if this were true in a hypothetical world of immediate, perfect
information, it is unlikely to be of much help in the real world, where damages awards are
calculated years or decades later, and where juries do not learn of the other contributions to
the success of the product or, worse, are prohibited by the entire market value rule from
taking them into account.
42. The first explicit reference to the use of the entire market value rule in reasonable
royalty cases came in Rite-Hite, a lost profits case. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538,
1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Rite-Hite relied in turn on State Industries, which did not in
fact apply the entire market value rule and which was, in any event, also a lost profits case.
State Indus., Inc. v. Mar-Flo Indus., Inc., 833 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The Federal Circuit
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Even in cases that don't apply the entire market value rule,
courts have applied the reasonable royalty statute with insufficient
sensitivity to the importance of noninfringing components to the
value of the overall product. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has even
imported the concept of "convoyed sales" of noninfringing goods to
the reasonable royalty context, suggesting that a reasonable royalty
must include some compensation to the patentee for the value the
defendant obtained from sales of unpatented goods that would likely
have been sold alongside the patented ones.43 This approach suffers
from the same flaw as the application of the entire market value
rule: it attributes the value of unpatented technologies to the patent
owner in circumstances in which the patent owner would not have
made sales of those technologies, and, therefore, in which the
infringer would have had to pay to develop or acquire the technology
from somewhere else.
While the Georgia-Pacific factors include several that require the
consideration of the value of those noninfringing components,44 in
fact for a variety of reasons those components are undervalued.45
Most notably, in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply, the
Federal Circuit simply rejected the very idea that a patentee's
remedy should be apportioned based on the share of the value of the
overall product the patentee contributed.46 The district court quite
reasonably had concluded that the parties would have set a royalty
rate based on the proportion of the value of the defendant's product
that was "attributable to the invention."47 The Federal Circuit
reversed and required that the award take the form of a percentage
of the defendant's entire product sales, even if that exceeded the
did not apply the doctrine in a reasonable royalty case until after dictum in Rite-Hite
suggested that the doctrine already applied in those cases. For a discussion of the evolution
of the reasonable royalty cases in the Supreme Court before the creation of the Federal
Circuit, see Bensen & White, supra note 29, at 22-27. For a history of the apportionment
principle in patent cases, see Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary
Patent Damages Cases, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 23-45 (2005).
43. See, e.g., TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895,901 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Trans-World
Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
44. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
45. For a detailed discussion of various reasons for this undervaluation, see, for example,
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 2023-35.
46. 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
47. Id. at 1570.
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total profit the defendant made on the product." Ignoring the
other components that contribute to defendant's sales, as Fromson
appears to require, is intellectually indefensible. 9 Not surprisingly,
this approach has led to reasonable royalty rates that are decidedly
unreasonable, and indeed that often exceed the defendant's total
profit on a product even when that product was composed primarily
of noninfringing components.50
Finally, and most dramatically, courts have occasionally simply
increased the reasonable royalty award because they fear that it
undercompensated a plaintiff that should in fact have received lost
profits. Panduit is the most notable example. 51 In that case, dis-
cussed in Part I, the court affirmed the district court's rejection of
plaintiffs lost-profits theory for hypertechnical reasons." Having
done so, it proceeded to excoriate the district court for applying the
normal reasonable royalty rules. Instead, the appellate court re-
imported many of the concepts of lost profits, reasoning that the
defendant would not have been able to make the sales at all but for
the infringement, and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to
damages that far exceeded the 60 percent of defendant's profit that
the district court had awarded as a reasonable royalty." Although
the Federal Circuit has rejected the express use of "kickers" to
compensate patentees for attorney's fees, 4 the court also has
approved discretionary increases in the reasonable royalty designed
to avoid undercompensation, which amounts to much the same
thing.55 Courts have expressly rejected reasonable royalty numbers
48. Id. at 1577-78.
49. It is also historically indefensible, as Bensen and White have demonstrated. See
Bensen & White, supra note 29, at 22-27.
50. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 2032 (studying reasonable royalty
determinations and finding an average royalty rate of 13.1 percent).
By contrast, some cases suggest that Fromson is wrong and that apportionment is
permissible. See, e.g., Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir.
2002). The Federal Circuit seemed to endorse apportionment of damages in its most recent
decision on the issue. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
51. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978).
52. Id. at 1156-57.
53. Id. at 1158-64.
54. Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that no
"kicker" is permissible on top of the reasonable royalty to compensate for attorney's fees or
litigation expenses; patentee must prove case is exceptional to recover such expenses).
55. See, e.g., Maxwell v. J. Baker, 86 F.3d 1098,1109-10 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (affirming award
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because they felt that those numbers would undercompensate a
plaintiff who was in fact a competitor.56 And there is reason to
believe that courts continue to award relatively high reasonable
royalties and to distort the concept of a hypothetical negotiation
between willing buyers and willing sellers, in part to compensate
plaintiffs who, in a perfect world, would have been able to prove
entitlement to lost profits.
57
These distortions to reasonable royalty case law are problematic.
While in theory a reasonable royalty approach could properly
compensate nonpracticing patent owners, Carl Shapiro and I have
offered both reasons and evidence demonstrating that, in practice,
the reasonable royalty approach systematically overcompensates
patent owners in component industries.5" Indeed the situation has
gotten so bad that some patentees who can prove lost profits elect
instead to seek a "reasonable" royalty that is far in excess both of
what the parties would have negotiated and of the actual losses the
patentee suffered.59 And the Federal Circuit has rejected the
perfectly sensible idea that a hypothetical negotiation between
willing buyers and sellers is one that would in fact leave the buyer
with some profit. ° By importing compensation concepts from lost
of $1.5 million additional damages on top of reasonable royalty award); King Instruments
Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 951 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing "discretionary increases");
Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (allowing for "an increase in the
reasonable royalty determined by the court"); Maxwell v. Angel-Etts, No. CV 9910516DT,
2001 WL 34133507, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2001) (approving jury's additional award of
damages beyond reasonable royalty damages).
56. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
57. See supra note 33.
58. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 2023-25.
59. See, e.g., Mars, 527 F.3d at 1374 (holding that reasonable royalty rate could exceed
what defendants would have been able to pay and still make a profit); Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (awarding reasonable royalty damages of
more than six times Monsanto's lost profits); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (approving a royalty that far exceeded the defendant's profit from
infringement); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(upholding a reasonable royalty that exceeded the infringer's profits from the product). For
a discussion of this issue, see, for example, Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives
to Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307
(2006). The reader should be aware that I represented McFarling in Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling.
60. See Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1383 (rejecting infringer's argument that a "reasonable royalty
deduced through a hypothetical negotiation process can never be set so high that no rational
self-interested wealth- maximizing infringer acting ex ante would have ever agreed to it"); cf.
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profits into the reasonable royalty context without importing the
strict elements of proof, these courts have turned the reasonable
royalty from a floor on patent damages designed to avoid under-
compensation into a windfall that overcompensates patentees.
At least some, perhaps most, of that overcompensation can be
traced to efforts in cases like Panduit to compensate practicing
patent owners who should be entitled to lost profits damages.61
There is no other possible explanation for giving a patentee a
royalty based on convoyed sales, for example. And the problem
threatens to get worse, not better: the House of Representatives is
currently attempting to solve one of the problems I have identi-
fied-the fact that modern courts ignore the contributions of
nonpatented technologies and refuse to apportion damages-while
cementing into the statute an equally serious problem-the mis-
application of the entire market value rule in reasonable royalty
cases." If manufacturing patent owners can capture the entire
market value of a technology based on their invention of a single
component, that overcompensation will encourage too much patent
litigation by nonpracticing entities, exacerbate the already-serious
problem of royalty stacking, and discourage the sale of products that
incorporate many components.
But there is some reason for optimism. The Lucent v. Gateway
decision may signal an important step towards the use of apportion-
ment. While the court in that case held that a patentee of a minor
software feature could use the entire royalty base for Microsoft
Windows,6" the royalty rate had to factor in the minor nature of the
Mars, 527 F.3d at 1373 (rejecting as "wrong as a matter of law" the idea that the reasonable
royalty will be limited by the noninfringing alternatives available to the infringer); Parker-
Hannifin Corp. v. Champion Labs., No. 1:06-CV-2616, 2008 WL 3166318, at *7-8 (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 4, 2008) (same).
61. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
62. See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007). By contrast, the Senate version, S. 515, would
require neither apportionment nor the entire market value rule. The fate of patent reform
legislation was unclear at this writing.
63. Inexplicably, the Federal Circuit referred to this royalty base issue as the entire
market value rule. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
As the text makes clear, the two questions are distinct. The entire market value rule involves
an effort to lay claim to components of a product the patentee didn't invent, but which the
patentee might have been able to sell along with the patented component. The royalty base
question comes up in every royalty case, whether or not the entire market value rule applies.
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patentee's contribution.' By rejecting a jury verdict that did not
clearly apportion damages, the Federal Circuit has made it harder
for patent plaintiffs to use large royalty bases to produce inflated
awards. But it remains to be seen whether district courts will be
able and willing to serve as gatekeepers, excluding weak damages
evidence and reversing unsupported jury verdicts.
III. THE TWO DOMAINS OF PATENT DAMAGES
The purpose of both patent damages rules is ultimately the
same-to compensate the inventor for losses attributable to the
infringement-but they are directed at fundamentally different
types of losses. Lost profits damages compensate patent owners who
would have had partial or complete market exclusivity in the
absence of infringement." To make those patent owners whole,
defendants must be made to pay in many cases more than they
made by infringing, since it is elementary economics that competi-
tion results in lower producer surplus than monopoly.66 By contrast,
reasonable royalty damages are designed to mimic the result that
patentees not interested in or able to take advantage of market
exclusivity would have achieved if they had been able to bargain
with the infringers beforehand.87 To avoid encouraging infringe-
ment, the reasonable royalty calculus properly skews the damages
award upward by making the counterfactual assumption that the
bargainers would have known that the patent was both valid and
infringed.68 But the ultimate aim is not to mimic exclusivity, or to
give patentees the full social value of their technology, but instead
to set a rate that would have both compensated patentees and
allowed users of the technology to make a reasonable profit, taking
64. Id. at 1337.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
66. See supra note 32.
67. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
68. Cf. Paul M. Janicke & Lilan Ren, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 8 (2006) (finding that patentees
lose three-quarters of patent cases); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents,
19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 79-83 (2005) (noting the probabilistic nature of patent rights in
practice).
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into account the other patents they must license and the other costs
they must incur to sell the product.69
Unlike market exclusivity claims, patentees whose injury is in
lost licensing revenue have no legitimate claim that they would
have made or controlled the sale of unpatented components of the
defendant's product or of convoyed sales of related products. Their
compensation should be based on the value that the patented
invention actually contributes as a proportion of the defendant's
product, taking into account the other patents, know-how, raw
materials, and labor that also contribute to the value of that product
and the existence of possible alternatives to the patented technol-
ogy. Thus, a truly reasonable royalty is one that bases the patentee's
damages on the merits of the incremental contribution of the
patent. ° The distortions I described in Part II occur because courts
want to give patentees in the first category damages adequate to
compensate for the loss of market exclusivity. If lost profits are not
available, they import those market exclusivity concepts into
reasonable royalty case law.7
Congress has considered reforming the damages statute in ways
that would mandate application of this logical apportionment
principle in reasonable royalty cases.72 Unfortunately-and sur-
prisingly-that proposed reform has proven controversial, raising
objections not just from patent trolls who want to lay claim to a
disproportionate share of the defendant's product but also from
industry groups such as pharmaceutical companies that in fact have
nothing to fear from reasonable royalty reform.73 As a result, the bill
69. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 2019.
70. Theoretically, that contribution could be zero if the patent is no better than available
noninfringing alternatives. See Schlicher, supra note 10, at 503, 527-29; cf. Roger D. Blair &
Thomas M. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 74 (2001)
(suggesting achieving the same result by creating a "patent injury" doctrine analogous to the
"antitrust injury" doctrine that requires a showing of causation before entitlement to relief);
Julie S. Turner, Note, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient
Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179, 204 (1998) (arguing that patent owners who are not injured
should not be able to sue, and contending that those who do not practice or license their
patents have not been injured). In practice, however, courts that find a patent valid and
infringed almost always award some royalty.
71. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
72. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
73. Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1908 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 40-41 (2007)
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that passed the House in 2007 blended the salutary apportionment
ideas with a rule that would compel application of the entire market
value rule in reasonable royalty cases.74 That outcome may actually
be worse than no change at all, because it will give patentees whose
only injury is lost licensing revenue an incentive to argue for the
value of components they had no hand in inventing or implement-
ing.
Assuming Congress does not act to enshrine the entire market
value rule in reasonable royalty cases, the courts have the power to
fix the problem with reasonable royalty damages. To do so, courts
(or Congress, should it decide to act) should expressly distinguish
between damage theories appropriate in lost profits cases and those
appropriate in reasonable royalty cases. Patentees whose harm is
based on a loss of market exclusivity-those who reasonably could
have expected to make additional sales, or sales at a higher price,
absent infringement-should be entitled to lost profits damages.
Patentees whose harm is lost licensing revenue, but who could not
plausibly claim to have lost sales as a result of the infringement,
should be entitled to reasonable royalties, but those reasonable
royalties should be calculated based on what the market would
actually have borne assuming infringement of a valid patent, and
should not include 'kickers" or the allocation of the entire market
value to a patentee who only contributed part of that value.75
Enforcing a strict divide between these groups should help to end
the distortions of reasonable royalty damages that have contributed
to the royalty stacking and patent holdup problems.
To make this strict divide work, courts will need to be more
lenient than they have been in requiring proof of lost profits.76 I do
not mean to suggest that courts should award lost profits to those
who have not in fact lost them. It makes sense to require evidence
that the patentee would in fact have made sales absent the infringe-
(statement of Kevin Shaver, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Amgen
Incorporated).
74. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
75. A return to this approach would be consistent with Supreme Court precedent on the
question. See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 490-91 (1853) (rejecting the idea
that a patentee on a component is entitled to royalties equivalent to the inventor of an entire
product).
76. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
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ment, if for no other reason than to deter undeserving claimants
from alleging that, but for the infringement, their failed companies
would in fact have become a market leader. But where the problem
is imprecision in calculating lost profits, it is important to keep in
mind that the alternative to denying lost profits is a less precise,
and more distorted, reasonable royalty measure. Courts too often
have been willing to allow technical failures of proof-a lack of
detail in separating profits from costs, or insufficiently specifying
market demand-to doom a claim for lost profits.77 They have also
required proof that the patentee itself could have met the market
demand, ignoring the prospect that a patentee could grant a
territorially or product-limited exclusive license to another firm to
pick up the slack.78 Courts have imposed these requirements secure
in the knowledge that the patentee would still be compensated by
reasonable royalties. But under a strict divide approach, a patentee
who can show that it is more likely than not that an infringer's sales
cut into its own should be entitled to the court's best estimate of the
patentee's lost profits. That estimate may not be perfect, but it is
likely to be at least as accurate as the alternative reasonable royalty
measure 79 and will avoid distorting the reasonable royalty cases
that are not brought by patentees claiming market exclusivity.
Fortunately, this need not require a big change in Federal Circuit
jurisprudence. There are a number of pre-Rite Hite Federal Circuit
cases that find lost profits despite the difficulty of calculating profits
or the uncertainty of a counterfactual world.8'
77. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
78. Cf. Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Profit Neutrality in Licensing: The
Boundary Between Antitrust Law and Patent Law, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 476, 483-86 (2006)
(suggesting ways patentees could structure royalties to both participate in the market and
license others to fill remaining demand).
79. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that courts have insisted on strict compliance with the
elements of proof of a lost profits claim, given that the reasonable royalty alternative involves
at least as much uncertainty and approximation. Cf. Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co.,
298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (observing that reasonable royalty calculus "necessarily
involves some approximation of the market as it would have hypothetically developed absent
infringement").
80. See, e.g., Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Evidence that shows a reasonable probability that the patent owner would
have made the infringing sales made by the infringer will suffice.... Thus, the patent owner
need not prove causation as an absolute certainty."); Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton
Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that the district court erred
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With manufacturing patent owners and those that have granted
exclusive licenses to manufacturing firms more clearly protected
under the lost profits prong, the reasonable royalty measure of
damages can return to its original role-as a means of ensuring that
patentees aren't denied fair compensation for the value they could
have demanded in a fair market for a nonexclusive license to their
patents."' It will also render largely irrelevant the question of
whether reasonable royalties can exceed proven lost profits and
therefore end the growing practice of patentees opting for a
distorted measure of royalties that is greater than the profits they
actually lost.
A couple of complications deserve brief mention. First, what
should be done with a patentee who does not itself practice the
invention, and so could not have made the profits directly, but who
has granted an exclusive license to another party that does practice?
In my view, a patentee who has granted an exclusive license should
stand in the shoes of the exclusive licensee; if the exclusive licensee
has lost profits because of infringement, those losses should be
compensable in a suit by either or both parties, divided as per the
agreement between them.82 The decision to manufacture inside or
outside a firm is one that should be driven by costs, not by fear of
changed legal consequences.8 3
Second, there are also cases in which a patentee can prove that it
would have made some but not all of the defendant's sales. In that
case a hybrid award makes sense, with the patentee receiving lost
profits on provable losses and a reasonable royalty on other sales.
Notably, a licensor in such a situation is likely to be more concerned
about the price and quantity licensed, since the licensed goods will
compete with its own products. As a result, reasonable royalties in
because it "gave controlling weight to the difficulty of the calculation, and in so doing adopted
a measure of damages that was not designed to make whole the injured party").
81. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
82. The Federal Circuit has treated the two differently for purposes of awarding both lost
profits and injunctive relief. See Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (patentee cannot rely on profits lost by a subsidiary); Voda v. Cordis, Inc., 536 F.3d
1311, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
83. On patents and the nature of the firm, see, for example, Dan L. Burk & Brett
McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the
Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 575.
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those hybrid cases may more closely approximate lost profits
damages.'
Finally, there may be circumstances in which a patentee does
compete in the market, but is so inefficient that it would make no
profits even in the absence of infringement. Such a patentee should
not be precluded from obtaining a reasonable royalty from its more
efficient competitors in lieu of a lost profits award. The point of my
analysis is to separate the theories of harm to patentees, not to
suggest that by choosing to practice an entity foregoes the backstop
of a reasonable royalty.
CONCLUSION
Patent damages are supposed to compensate patent owners for
their losses, putting them back in the world they would have
inhabited but for infringement. The lost profits analysis contains
sophisticated economic tools to help courts calculate that but-for
world. Unfortunately, the perfect has too often been the enemy of
the good, relegating a number of lost profits cases to the rather less
economically sophisticated analysis of reasonable royalties. Worse,
the importation of concepts from lost profits into reasonable royalty
analysis, and the fear of undercompensating deserving patent
owners that should have been able to prove lost profits, has led to
systematic distortions in the reasonable royalty structure that
overcompensate nonmanufacturing patent owners. Enforcing a
strict separation between the two and easing the burden of proof on
lost profits will enable both types of patent damages to serve the
compensatory purpose for which they were intended.
84. See Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 78 (arguing that a patentee should be able to
maximize profits through partial manufacturing and partial licensing).
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